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L.T. Visscher 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 
Abstract 
 
Monitoring or supervision in the sense of observing behaviour to establish 
whether the observed party has acted according to the applicable norms or stan-
dards of behavior is one of the many possibilities to influence behaviour. In this 
paper, several legal instruments (tort law, regulation and criminal law) are ana-
lysed as instruments to induce parties to behave according to the rules. Those 
instruments are divided on the basis of when the norm is formulated (before or 
after the externality is caused), who initiates enforcement of the norm (individ-
ual people or the government), how the instrument works (directly or indirectly) 
and the stage of legal intervention (preclusion, act-based sanctions and harm-
based sanctions). It is argued that all instruments have strong and weak points, 
and that a combination of instruments is necessary. The costs of monitoring and 
supervision are relevant in determining the optimal mix of enforcement instru-
ments, but are not all-decisive. 
 
1. Introduction 
  
In this paper, I will discuss the topic of monitoring and supervision from an eco-
nomic point of view. The Pocket Oxford English Dictionary defines to monitor 
as ‘observe someone or something in order to record or regulate their activity or 
progress’, and to supervise as ‘watch and direct the performance of a task or the 
work of a person’.1 For the purpose of this paper, I will use both terms as syno-
nyms, denoting the situation where an actor observes the behaviour of another 
actor, in order to establish whether the latter has acted according to the applica-
ble norms or standards of behaviour.  
Given the focus of this workshop on safety and security in society, I will limit 
myself to insights from Law and Economics that deal with safety and security. 
In economic terms, I will link the issue of monitoring to the problem of inter-
nalization of negative externalities (section 2). Different legal instruments exist 
with which this internalization can be strived for. I will treat three of such in-
struments (tort law, regulation and criminal law) and I will compare these in-
struments on their relative strengths and weaknesses (section 3). Subsequently, I 
will treat the literature on the topic of ‘optimal enforcement’ (section 4). It will 
become clear that society should not aim for a minimum level of violations of 
                                                
1  C. Soanes, S. Hawker and J. Elliot (Eds.), Pocket Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edition, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005. 
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standards and norms, but an optimal level. The benefits of more enforcement 
have to be weighed against the costs of the measures that are taken to improve 
enforcement. Monitoring contributes to those costs, so that a decrease in those 
costs due to e.g. new technology affects the optimal level of enforcement and 
the optimal mix of instruments to attain this level. In section 5, I will discuss 
economic literature regarding monitoring and enforcement of environmental 
policy, because this provides a clear and interesting example of the previously 
developed insights. Section 6 contains the conclusions. 
 
2. Safety and security in society: internalization of negative exter-
nalities 
 
In the economic analysis of law it is assumed that when people are confronted 
with different possible actions, they choose the one of which they believe that it 
is best for them, given their information. This is the so-called rational choice 
theory.2 Therefore, if someone has to choose between obeying a legal rule or 
breaking it, he makes an assessment of the consequences of both actions, and 
chooses the action which yields the best results. The legal rules influence this 
process. 
If, for example, I have to choose between keeping to the speed limit or driving 
with excessive speed, I weigh my private benefits of speeding (saving time, en-
joying the speed, et cetera) against the possible costs thereof (more use of gaso-
line, the possibility of a fine, et cetera). The higher the possible fine or the 
greater the likelihood that I will indeed be fined for speeding, the less attractive 
speeding becomes. My final decision whether or not to speed therefore is influ-
enced by the likelihood of being sanctioned and the severity of the sanction. 
 
If people undertake activities, they might cause possible negative consequences 
for others. If I speed, I cause more pollution and create more risks for others 
than if I keep to the speed limit. If a factory produces, it might create noise, 
smell and pollution for the people in the vicinity. It might also endanger the em-
ployees working with dangerous machines. 
If the party who causes these negative consequences for others does not have to 
pay for them, he creates a negative externality. This party does not incorporate 
all costs of the activity in his decision whether to participate in the activity and 
if yes, to what extent. The private costs of the activity therefore are lower than 
the social costs. From a social point of view it is desirable that one only engages 
in an activity if the full costs are lower than the full benefits. If the actor does 
not have to bear all the costs himself, he engages in the activity too often. Part of 
the costs is born by others, and these costs lower social welfare. Only by weigh-
ing the full costs and benefits of the activity, welfare can be maximized. 
                                                
2  See e.g. J. Elster, ‘Introduction’, in: J. Elster (ed.), Rational Choice, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986, 
p.3; E. Mackaay, ‘Schools: general’, in: B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics. Volume II. Civil Law and Economics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2000, p. 408. 
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If the actor who causes the externality is forced to pay for it himself, he will 
make the correct cost/benefit analysis. He has then internalized the negative ex-
ternality. Different methods of internalization exist. First, in situations where the 
parties involved can cheaply negotiate with each other (in economic terms, the 
transaction costs are low), they can reach an agreement on the price that the pol-
luter has to pay in order to be allowed to produce, or alternatively on the price 
that the other party has to pay to the polluter to stop him polluting.3 In reality, 
these situations of low transactions costs are scarce, and other instruments are 
needed. 
The use of taxes, the second method to be discussed, is such an alternative. If the 
factory that pollutes the surroundings has to pay a tax that covers the costs of 
cleaning up the pollution, the factory has internalized the negative externality. 
The costs of the tax will be passed on to the consumers, who face a higher price. 
They will buy less of the product and maybe switch to a cheaper product. The 
producer therefore gets an incentive to reduce the pollution, if the costs of avoid-
ing (part of) the pollution are lower than the decrease in taxes that it causes. 
However, it might be very difficult to exactly calculate the optimal tax, because 
each additional unit of production should be taxed by the additional pollution 
that this unit has caused. 
Third, fines and non-monetary sanctions can in theory lead to internalization of 
externalities, if they are based on the negative effects of the behaviour on others. 
Forth, tort law can lead to internalization. If the damages that the injurer has to 
pay are based on the losses he has caused to the victim, the injurer is confronted 
with the negative consequences of his behaviour. He will take care measures 
that cost less than the losses they avoid, and he also might reduce his activity 
level. 
Finally, negative externalities can be avoided if regulation exactly describes the 
way in which a certain activity has to be undertaken. If a factory e.g. needs a 
permit to produce, and if this permit requires the manufacturer to take measures 
that avoid or reduce pollution, the factory is confronted with the costs of these 
measures, and therefore it cannot externalize pollution on the people living 
nearby. The consumers will pay for the measures through the price, and a cor-
rect weighing between costs and benefits is made. 
 
3. Relative strengths and weaknesses of tort law, regulation and 
criminal law 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The different instruments for internalizing externalities can be divided on the 
basis of at least four criteria.4 First, it can be asked if the norm is formulated ex 
                                                
3  R.A. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost, (3) The Journal of Law and Economics 1960, p. 1-44. 
4  S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 
1987, p. 278 ff.; S. Shavell, ‘The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement’, (36) The Journal of Law 
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ante (so before the externality is caused) or ex post (after the externality is 
caused). Ex ante formulation is often done on a very detailed level, so that the 
norm exactly describes how the actors should behave. On the opposite, ex post 
formulation implies that an open norm is used, which is specified ex post on the 
basis of the circumstances of the actual case at hand. 
Second, enforcement of the norm can be initiated by the government or by indi-
vidual people. In private law, it is often the individual that starts a case, e.g. by 
suing the person who has committed a tort or who breached a contract. In crimi-
nal law, on the other hand, it is often the government (through the public prose-
cutor) who initiates the case. 
Third, the way in which the externality is combated can be direct or indirect. If 
an indirect method is used, the actor receives incentives to change his behaviour, 
e.g. by the prospect of having to pay a fine if he acts wrongly or damages if he 
causes losses. Also imprisonment, taxes and subsidies are indirect ways to influ-
ence behaviour. Direct methods, on the other hand, exactly describe the way in 
which the actor has to act, and also enforce this. For example, the government 
can issue detailed norms for maximum emission of pollution, and close down a 
factory that exceeds the limits. Also an injunction directly combats the external-
ity. 
The fourth distinction partially overlaps the distinctions ex ante/ex post and di-
rect/indirect. Legal intervention can take place at three stages. When it takes 
place at the earliest possible stage, the harmful act is precluded. This is ex ante 
intervention in a direct manner, e.g. a police officer that stops an actor from 
committing a crime. Preclusion occurs through the use of force or physical bar-
riers. Legal intervention may also result after the act has been committed, but 
before harm results or irrespective of whether it does. E.g. a speeding ticket is 
issued on the basis of speeding, irrespective of whether the speeding motorist 
caused losses. Such act-based sanctions are ex ante, indirect methods. Finally, 
legal intervention might be triggered by causing harm. E.g. tort damages can 
only be sued for after losses already have occurred. These harm-based sanctions 
are ex post and indirect. The difference between act-based and harm-based in-
struments can also be characterized as input monitoring versus output monitor-
ing.5
Tort law, regulation and criminal law can be categorized on the basis of these 
criteria. It is important to realize that the first three criteria are not binary in 
character, but rather form three continuums. For example, tort law is mostly ex 
post (by applying the open due care norm, which is specified after an accident), 
but rules of strict liability are formulated ex ante. When discussing the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the different instruments, this characteristic of con-
tinuums should be kept in mind. 
 
                                                                                                                
and Economics 1993, p. 257 ff; S. Shavell, Foundations of Law and Economics, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2004, p. 572 ff. 
5  D. Wittman, ‘Prior Regulation versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitor-
ing’, (6) The Journal of Legal Studies 1977, p. 193. 
 
Monitoring and supervision in the economic analysis of safety and security 101 
As explained above, internalization of externalities increases welfare, because 
the actors make a better weighing between the costs and benefits of their activi-
ties. This avoids a too high activity level and a too low care level, which would 
cause negative consequences for third parties. However, the instruments that can 
achieve internalization might be more or less costly themselves. These costs of 
internalization should be taken into account when deciding which instrument(s) 
to use. The costs also influence the optimal level of enforcement: it is socially 
desirable to allow a certain degree of norm breaking behaviour (even though this 
causes negative externalities), because the costs of avoiding these violations are 
higher than the benefits of additional deterrence. Furthermore, information on 
the behaviour of the actors and the consequences thereof is needed to internalize 
externalities. It is more or less costly to acquire and process the necessary in-
formation, and these costs also have to be taken into account when choosing the 
internalization instrument(s) and when determining the desired rate of compli-
ance. 
 
3.2. Tort law 
 
3.2.1. The criteria applied 
 
Tort cases are primarily initiated by the victims, so that the initiative lies with 
individual people instead of with the government. The most important tort is 
negligence, hence the violation of an unwritten, open norm of due care. There-
fore, tort law is primarily ex post. However, in situations of strict liability, or 
when the tort consists of violating a statutory duty, ex ante features are domi-
nant. In most cases, plaintiffs sue for damages, so that tort law primarily is an 
indirect way of fighting externalities. In the more exceptional cases where plain-
tiffs ask an injunction, it is direct. Tort law mostly uses harm-based sanctions 
(damages), although an injunction is an instrument that precludes the damaging 
act. 
 
3.2.2. The economics of tort law in a nutshell 
 
Law and economics scholars argue that tort law can lead to the internalization of 
externalities, because the tortfeasor is confronted with the negative conse-
quences of his behaviour for others. This result can be achieved through negli-
gence and strict liability.  
Under negligence, an injurer is only liable for the losses if he did not take 
enough care. In formulating the level of due care, the court should compare the 
costs and benefits of care measures that the injurer could have taken. If the costs 
of an additional care measure are lower than the benefits thereof (the reduction 
in the accident probability and/or the reduction in the losses if an accident oc-
curs), yet the injurer did not take this measure, he should be deemed negligent.6 
                                                
6  This is the so-called Hand formula, named after judge Learned Hand who applied this line of reason-
ing in the case United States v. Carroll Towing Co.(159F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)).  He argued that an 
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This induces the injurer to take the care measures that cost less than they yield, 
so that social welfare is maximized. Under strict liability, the injurer is always 
liable, irrespective of his care level. He will therefore take all the care measures 
that he himself thinks are cost justified.  
A major difference between negligence and strict liability therefore is, that under 
negligence the court decides the due care level and the injurer adapts his behav-
iour to it, while under strict liability the injurer chooses his care level himself. 
The quality and costs of information for courts and injurers therefore form an 
important aspect in the choice between the two rules. 
In addition, under strict liability the injurer will engage less often in the activity, 
because he has to bear the full costs thereof. Hence, he will only engage in the 
activity if the utility that this yields exceeds the full costs of the activity. This 
leads to an optimal activity level, because the costs and benefits are weighed 
properly. Under negligence, however, the injurer only has to bear the costs of 
due care, so that he already engages in the activity as soon as it yields him more 
utility than those care costs. The activity level under negligence will therefore be 
too high. 
 
3.2.3. Relative strengths of tort law 
 
First, tort law predominantly applies open norms, which are easy to formulate. 
The costs of norm formulation therefore are low. The disadvantage of open 
norms (they do not give clear guidelines for behaviour) will be limited, because 
over time, legal verdicts specify the open norm for different types of situations. 
Second, only in cases where harm occurred and a suit is filed, the open norm has 
to be specified. Given that many cases are settled outside of court, or are dealt 
with administratively by insurance companies, the system costs will be rela-
tively low. The system costs are presumably lower under strict liability than un-
der negligence, because the court does not have to investigate whether the in-
jurer was at fault. Each case is therefore less complicated under strict liability. 
The possible result that more cases might be filed is more than offset by the fact 
that more cases will be settled, due to the higher degree of predictability of the 
courts’ decision. 
Furthermore, courts are less sensitive to the influence of interest groups than 
legislators, and the open norms in tort law limit the possible benefits of influenc-
ing decisions anyway. 
Fourth, tort law utilizes the information that is available to the parties involved. 
In typical tort cases, the victim knows who injured him, so the costs of identify-
ing the injurer are relatively low.7 In the choice between strict liability and neg-
ligence, information is relevant as well. Under negligence, the court has to 
                                                                                                                
injurer was negligent if the burden of adequate precautions (B) was lower than the product of the 
probability of an accident (p) and the gravity of the resulting injury if an accident occurs, so if B < 
pL. 
7  W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’, (4) The Journal of Legal Studies 
1975, p. 31; Shavell 1993, op.cit. (note 4), p. 267. 
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weigh the costs and benefits of care measures in formulating the due care level. 
Under strict liability, the injurer himself decides which level of care to take. If 
the injurer has better information about the costs and benefits of taking care (e.g. 
because he is a specialized manufacturer of complicated products), strict liability 
is preferable, because it makes use of the superior information of the injurer. 
 
3.2.4. Relative weaknesses of tort law 
 
The indirect approach, using tort damages as instrument, requires that victims 
indeed bring suit and that all injurers who committed a tort indeed pay damages. 
There are many factors that lead to a too low ‘probability of conviction’. Vic-
tims might decide not to bring suit because the costs are higher than the ex-
pected benefits (which is especially problematic with losses that are spread over 
a large group of people, so that each individual victim only bears a small loss, 
but the total loss can be substantial),8 or they might face problems in proving 
fault or causation. In principle, increasing the amount that the injurer has to pay, 
so that the expected damages (i.e. the probability of having to pay damages, 
multiplied by the magnitude of these damages) again equal the expected losses 
caused by the injurer, can offset this too low probability of conviction. However, 
many countries do not accept such punitive damages, and high levels of dam-
ages might lead to the judgment proof problem. 
An injurer is said to be judgment proof, if he does not have enough assets to pay 
the damages. Tort law then cannot provide correct behavioural incentives, be-
cause an injurer will not be deterred by damages that he cannot pay anyway. 
Vicarious liability might solve this problem. This implies that someone else is 
held liable instead of the actual tortfeasor. From an economic point of view, vi-
carious liability makes sense if the liable party has more assets than the actual 
tortfeasor (so that the judgment proof problem is avoided) and if the liable party 
has other instruments to provide care incentives for the tortfeasor. For example, 
an employer is often vicariously liable for the torts committed by his employees. 
The employer presumably has more assets, and he can provide care incentives 
through the labour relation (granting or withholding promotion, wage raises, 
terminating the contract, et cetera). Of course, vicarious liability creates moni-
toring costs, because the principal has to supervise the agent in order to be able 
to determine his care level.9
Finally, the tendency in tort law to protect the victim ex post inefficiently in-
creases the standard of care for the injurer, while simultaneously decreasing the 
standard of care for the victim himself. 
 
                                                
8  See e.g. Landes and Posner 1975, ibid., p. 33. 
9  R. H. Kraakman, ‘Vicarious and Corporate Civil Liability’, in: B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest (eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Volume II. Civil Law and Economics, Cheltenham: Edward El-
gar 2000, p. 670, 671. 
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3.3. Regulation 
 
3.3.1. The criteria applied 
 
Regulation makes use of detailed rules that describe the way in which actors 
should behave. It is therefore an ex ante and direct method of dealing with ex-
ternalities. The government is the dominant actor, in issuing the regulation, in 
monitoring whether actors obey it and in enforcing the regulation by the use of 
force and/or fines. The timing of legal intervention can be at the earliest stage 
(e.g. not allowing a factory to produce before it adheres to the requirements 
posed by regulation), but regulation also uses act-based sanctions (e.g. imposing 
a fine if a building does not have proper fire exits). If costs of monitoring com-
pliance are high, harm-based sanction can be chosen, because the occurrence of 
harm can provide information on possible wrongful behaviour. 
 
3.3.2. The economics of regulation in a nutshell 
 
For the purpose of this paper, the notion that the regulator can provide and en-
force norms and standards for behaviour to fight negative externalities suf-
fices.10 If the regulator defines the norms and standards on the basis of a weigh-
ing of costs and benefits of possible care measures, regulation can provide actors 
with incentives to behave optimally. Obviously, in order to induce actors to obey 
the norms or standards, they have to be enforced, which causes enforcement 
costs. Monitoring and supervision, as well as execution of sanctions are sources 
of such costs. The complications that arise if the regulator does not possess ade-
quate information, or that pressure groups try to influence the regulator so that 
regulation does not primarily serve the general interest but the private interest of 
the pressure group, are treated in the subsequent sections. 
 
3.3.3. Relative strengths of regulation 
 
If the regulator has better information than courts or the parties involved, it is 
best that he formulates a clear norm on desirable behaviour. In formulating this 
norm, the regulator weighs the costs and benefits of possible care measures. 
Given his superior information, this will lead to a better rule than under negli-
gence (where the courts formulate the rule) or strict liability (where the injurer 
himself decides which measures to take).11 An additional advantage is, that 
regulation can be applied to all actors, so that regulation can benefit from 
economies of scale. The regulator e.g. can analyze the possible dangers of work-
                                                
10  See e.g. J. den Hertogh, ‘General Theories of Regulation’, in: B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest (eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Volume III. The Regulation of Contracts, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar 2000, p.229; R.G. Noll, ‘Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation’, in: R. 
Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization. Volume II, Amsterdam: 
North Holland 1989, p. 1256. 
11  S. Shavell, ‘Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety’, (13) The Journal of Legal Studies 1984, 
p. 359 ff. 
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ing with toxic chemicals, heavy equipment et cetera, and issue regulation on 
working conditions that affects all firms using these materials. 
Furthermore, the ex ante character of regulation solves the judgment proof prob-
lem, by either using instruments that preclude the act from being carried out al-
together, or by using act-based sanctions instead of harm-based sanctions. Act-
based fines can be (much) lower than harm-based fines/damages, because they 
can be discounted by the probability that the act leads to harm.12
Finally, because the government is the predominant actor, the problem that po-
tential victims might decide not to bring suit because their private costs are too 
high, is solved. 
 
3.3.4. Relative weaknesses of regulation 
 
Public Choice theory argues that the regulator is susceptible to the influence of 
interest groups. Therefore, regulation need not be the result of a correct weigh-
ing of costs and benefits of possible measures to internalize negative external-
ities. It might, on the other hand, be the result of a successful lobby, thereby 
promoting the interests of specific pressure groups instead of increasing social 
welfare. In order to issue regulation, the government often has to rely to a cer-
tain extent on information issued exactly by the parties that are being regulated. 
These parties will have an incentive to provide information in such a manner 
that it furthers their goals. This problem is known as capture.13
Regulation resembles fault liability in the sense that an injurer that keeps to the 
norms might not be subjected to sanctions. As explained in section 3.2.2, this 
leads to a too high activity level, compared to strict liability. 
An important drawback of regulation in the context of this paper, are the high 
system costs. Issuing detailed regulation is more costly than issuing open norms. 
This problem is worsened because regulation can be issued by different agen-
cies, so that problems of consistency occur (e.g. the doors of a day-care centre 
have to be locked due to regulation concerning the safety of children (it prevents 
them from running onto the street), but they have to be unlocked due to fire 
regulation).  
More importantly, because regulation is ex ante, the costs of monitoring can be 
very high. After all, monitoring occurs before it is clear if externalities exist. If 
administering speed controls, all motorists are monitored, not only those who 
are speeding. And if restaurants are (randomly) checked for their hygiene, also 
restaurants that obey all regulations are visited. Ex post measures do not have 
these high monitoring costs, because the victim of an accident might have 
enough incentives to respond to the externality after it has occurred, and in any 
case the measure is only applied in the exceptions where harm was caused. The 
costs of monitoring can theoretically be lowered by decreasing the level of 
monitoring (and thereby the probability of being caught), while simultaneously 
                                                
12  Shavell 1993, op.cit. (note 4), p. 262. 
13  M.E. Levine, ‘Regulatory Capture’, in: P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
and the Law: Volume 3, London: Macmillan 1998, p. 267-271. 
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raising the fine. The expected sanction remains the same, yet the costs of en-
forcement decrease.14 However, the increased fine in itself could again cause the 
problem of judgment proof. 
 
3.4. Criminal law 
 
3.4.1.. The criteria applied 
 
In criminal law, the government is the predominant actor in issuing the rules and 
in enforcing them, although in some cases the public prosecutor can only try a 
case after a complaint of the victim. The rules are formulated ex ante, but en-
forcement is mostly ex post (preventive detention is an exception to this). 
Criminal law can be applied before and after the criminal act, and also after 
harm has occurred. The applicable sanctions (fines or imprisonment) are indirect 
methods to internalize externalities, but if a person is detained, this directly pre-
vents him from committing other criminal acts. 
 
3.4.2. The economics of criminal law in a nutshell 
 
In his seminal article from 1968, Becker gave an economic analysis of crime and 
punishment. His main purpose was to determine how many resources and how 
much punishment should be used to enforce different kinds of legislation. Sev-
eral factors are relevant in answering this question. 
The first factor is the harm caused by norm violations, which increases with the 
number of offences.15 Of course, the offenders yield gains by their offences, and 
these gains also increase with the number of offences. Becker defines the net 
cost or damage to society as the difference between harm and gain.16 These net 
costs probably increase if the number of offences increases. 
The second factor is the cost of apprehension and conviction. The more is spent 
on police, courts, et cetera, the easier it is to discover offences and convict of-
fenders. The lower these costs, e.g. due to technologies such as fingerprinting, 
wiretapping, computer control and lie detecting, the cheaper a given level of 
apprehension and conviction would be. 
The third factor, the supply of offences, depends on the probability of apprehen-
sion and conviction and the severity of the sanction. It appears that an increase 
                                                
14  See e.g. A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, ‘Public Enforcement of Law’, in: B. Bouckaert and G. De 
Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Volume V. The Economics of Crime and Litiga-
tion, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2000, p. 312. 
15  G.S. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’, (76) Journal of Political Economy 
1968, p. 173. 
16  Shavell does not incorporate the gains that injurers get from committing intentional norm violations 
in the social welfare function. He regards their utility as ‘social illicit’. Friedman does not agree with 
this method, because by labeling certain activities as social undesirable, even if they yield more gains 
to the injurer than they cause losses for the victim, the conclusion that these acts are undesirable is 
presumed instead of proven. See Shavell 1987, op.cit. (note 4), p. 147 and D.D. Friedman, Law’s Or-
der. What Economics Has to Do with Law and Why it Matters, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press 2000, p. 229 ff. 
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in the probability has a greater effect than an increase in the punishment.17 Also 
other factors, such as income and law-abidingness due to education, are relevant. 
The last factor concerns punishments, which differ in the costs they impose on 
the offender. They also affect other members of society. The total costs of pun-
ishment are the cost to offenders plus the cost or minus the gains to others. Fines 
produce a gain that equals the cost to the offender, aside from collection costs. 
Imprisonment, on the other hand, also causes costs to others, e.g. the need for 
guards, buildings, et cetera. Imprisonment is therefore more expensive than the 
use of fines. 
According to Becker, the criminal justice system should aim to minimize the 
total social costs. This implies that the severity of a sanction should depend on 
the harm caused, but also on the probability of apprehension and conviction. 
Furthermore, imprisonment should be replaced by fines whenever possible, due 
to the lower social costs. Finally, one should not aim for maximum deterrence, 
but optimal deterrence. The enforcement costs are one of the factors determining 
the optimal level of enforcement.18
 
3.4.3. Relative strengths of criminal law 
 
Criminal law can make use of non-monetary sanctions such as imprisonment. 
These methods can offer a solution to the judgment proof problem. Even if an 
actor has limited assets so that the financial threat of fines or damages does not 
provide adequate behavioural incentives, the possibility of being detained might 
provide enough incentives after all.  
Criminal sanctions are regarded as relatively heavy, due to a negative reputation 
effect and the consequences they might have for employment or personal rela-
tionships. This offsets the low probability of conviction, because the expected 
sanction can still be high. 
The negative association that people generally have with criminal activities in 
itself can already prevent them from engaging in such activities, so that these 
norms do not cause high enforcement costs. However, this requires that criminal 
rules remain exceptional. The more types of undesired behaviour are treated as 
crimes, the less this ‘self-enforcement’ will occur. 
 
3.4.4. Relative weaknesses of criminal law 
 
Criminal law is an expensive instrument to control externalities. The punitive 
element essentially lowers social welfare because it imposes costs on the con-
victed offender without offering offsetting gains elsewhere. This problem is lar-
ger with imprisonment than with fines, because a fine is a transfer of money, 
while the imprisonment creates additional harm. 
This also implies that the consequences of a wrongful conviction are much 
greater than the consequences of a wrongful acquittal, so that the legal proce-
                                                
17  Becker 1968, op.cit. (note 15), p. 176. 
18  Becker 1968, op.cit. (note 15), p. 207 ff. 
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dure needs many safeguards against wrongful convictions. This increases the 
system costs and reduces the probability of conviction. It also might cause high 
monitoring costs, because it is only worthwhile to start the costly criminal pro-
cedure if there is enough evidence to sustain the charge. 
Furthermore, imprisonment is a costly sanction, when compared to fines and 
damages, not only because of the stigmatizing character, but also because of the 
high costs of guards, buildings et cetera. 
Finally, the officials in the whole process have to be monitored themselves, to 
avoid abuse of power et cetera. This introduces a new type of monitoring costs, 
because not only actors who might not act according to the norm have to be 
monitored, but also the officials in the criminal procedure. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
Tort law, regulation and criminal law all have their strengths and weaknesses. 
Depending on the circumstances, one instrument might work better than the 
other, and in economic theory it is well established that a combination of in-
struments is needed to optimally internalize negative externalities.19 If e.g. the 
legislator has the best information on the costs and benefits of certain types of 
behaviour, regulation is preferred over tort law. On the other hand, negligence is 
superior if courts have the best information, and strict liability if the injurer is 
the most informed party. Regulation might offer minimum safety rules, thereby 
profiting from economies of scale, but under specific circumstances, tort law 
might induce actors to take additional care measures. The use of ex post mone-
tary sanctions is problematic if the injurer is judgment proof, so that ex ante 
regulation or ex post non-monetary sanctions are more appealing in cases where 
optimal tort damages would be so high that they indeed cause judgment proof 
problems. Criminal law has high system costs due to e.g. the penalizing charac-
ter, but the non-monetary sanctions might be necessary to solve the problem that 
tort law does not provide adequate incentives in cases of widely spread losses. 
Generally speaking, Law and Economics has a preference for tort law. Private 
parties know their own preferences best and they can act accordingly. They of-
ten possess adequate information on costs and benefits of care measures and on 
the identity of the injurer. The system costs of tort law are relatively low, due to 
the ex post, harm-based sanctions and the open norm character. In cases where 
tort law does not work properly, due to informational problems, judgment proof 
injurers or too low probabilities of conviction, regulation and criminal law be-
come more important. Due to the high system costs, criminal law should serve 
as an ultimum remedium. 
The list of relevant factors in deciding the optimal mix of the different instru-
ments is long, and many interrelations between them exist. The costs of monitor-
ing are one of those factors. It is therefore important to realize that one should 
not solely focus on these costs, but has to embed them in the broader framework. 
                                                
19  See e.g. Shavell 1984, op.cit. (note 11), p. 365. 
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The costs should not be neglected either, because changes in the costs of moni-
toring, e.g. due to technological changes, influence the optimal mix of instru-
ments. In the next paragraph, I will therefore analyze the optimal mix of instru-
ments in general, and I will pay specific attention to the role of the costs of 
monitoring and supervision. 
 
4. Optimal enforcement and the influence of monitoring and su-
pervision 
 
4.1. The choice between preclusion, act-based and harm-based sanctions 
 
Several factors influence the choice between the different instruments to control 
risk. If the possible sanctions are only small, they might not be able to deter un-
desirable behaviour, so that preclusion through force or physical measures is the 
only possible alternative. As the magnitude of potential sanctions increases, act-
based sanctions become available as well, and if the magnitude becomes suffi-
ciently high, harm-based sanctions can be used. Shavell gives a clear numerical 
example regarding this relationship.20 Suppose that a person obtains a benefit of 
50 from an undesirable act that causes high losses with a probability of 20%. 
Also suppose that the highest possible sanction is 100, that there is a 30% 
chance that an act-based sanction will be applied and that there is a 30% chance 
that a harm-based sanction will be applied if harm occurs. Neither type of sanc-
tion can deter this person, because the expected act-based sanction is 0.3*100 = 
30 and the expected harm-based sanction is 0.2*0.3*100 = 6, while the private 
benefits where 50. The only way to avoid the undesirable act therefore is preclu-
sion by force or physical measures. The sanction has to be at least 166.67 for 
act-based sanctions to work (because 0.3*166.67 = 50) and 833.33 for harm-
based sanctions to work (because 0.2*0.3*833,33 = 50). The possible magnitude 
of sanctions is determined by the wealth of the party involved, or with impris-
onment by his remaining life. Also, notions of fairness can limit sanctions (e.g. 
life imprisonment for shoplifting would be considered as being unfair), and in 
the economic analysis of criminal law it is well established that the magnitude of 
the sanction should rise with the size of the harm (marginal deterrence). These 
limits on the magnitude of the sanction can lead to the necessity of increasing 
the probability of sanctioning, thereby probably increasing the costs of monitor-
ing, to offset the limited size of the sanction.21
Second, the probability of sanctioning is relevant. If it is difficult to preclude by 
force or physical measures, act-based or harm-based sanctions become more 
appealing. If monitoring of behaviour is difficult, preclusion or harm-based 
sanctions become more attractive. If it is difficult to establish a causal relation 
between certain harm and the possible acts that have caused them, preclusion or 
act-based sanctions are better. It should be noted that improvements in monitor-
                                                
20  Shavell 1993, op.cit. (note 4), p. 261 ff. 
21  See e.g. A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, ‘The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal 
Enforcement Policy’, (2) American Law and Economics Review 2000, p. 232. 
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ing techniques can increase the probability of sanctioning, but this might induce 
actors to spend resources in order to evade being detected. For example, radar 
controls have increased the probability of being caught when speeding, but de-
vices such as a radar detector or see-through covers for license plates that cause 
a picture of the license plate to be illegible could offset this increase (just as the 
mere destruction of camera poles would). Also, devices that scramble the signal 
of mobile phones or computer data reduce the effectiveness of monitoring these 
forms of communication. This can lead to a costly alternation of measures and 
countermeasures, which lowers social welfare. 
Third, the level of information is important. If parties have good information on 
the dangerousness of their behaviour, harm-based sanctions can provide correct 
incentives. If they lack this information but they know that certain behaviour is 
not allowed, act-based sanctions could deter adequately. If the actor is unaware 
of the dangers of his actions, he might not realize that his act is forbidden, so 
that neither harm-based nor act-based sanctions work. Preclusion then is the 
only option. This of course assumes that the social authority has better informa-
tion regarding the true dangers. 
Also the enforcement costs are relevant. If it is relatively cheap to deter people 
by using physical measures (e.g. fencing an area in which they otherwise might 
dump toxic waste), sanctions become less attractive. However, if preclusion re-
quires the use of officials who constantly have to monitor the behaviour of ac-
tors, it might become too expensive so that sanctions have to be used. Harm-
based sanctions then have an advantage over act-based sanctions, because they 
are applied less often. In some circumstances it may be easier to impose act-
based sanctions (e.g. determining whether oil tanks of ships are properly main-
tained might be easier than detecting whether a ship has leaked oil into the 
ocean),22 in other circumstances harm-based sanctions could be easier (e.g. de-
termining whether a driver who caused an accident made a wrong turn as op-
posed to constantly observing all drivers on their turns).  
Finally, determining the expected harm of an act might be much more difficult 
than ascertaining the actual harm if an accident has occurred. 
Technological developments can change the relative attractiveness of preclu-
sion, act-based sanctions and harm-based sanctions. For example, if speeding of 
motorists could only be detected by police officers that subsequently would have 
to chase the speeding motorist to fine him, act-based sanctions would be very 
expensive. The use of radar and photo cameras decreases these costs substan-
tially, so that act-based sanctions become feasible. Recent developments in so-
called Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) might even preclude speeding alto-
gether. With an ISA system, an onboard computer can, by the use of GPS, de-
termine the position of the vehicle. The computer checks whether the local 
speed limits are exceeded. If they are exceeded, the driver is warned by a signal, 
or the device even reduces the speed of the vehicle automatically. Detection of 
shoplifting through the use of electromagnetic gates instead of personnel that 
                                                
22  Polinsky and Shavell 2000, ibid., p. 315, 316. 
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constantly scans the shop is another example. Also the way in which drunk driv-
ing is combated might change, e.g. if alcohol locks become cheaper to manufac-
ture. This way, a drunk driver cannot drive his car and this act is therefore 
physically precluded.23 This might be better than act-based sanctions (a fine 
and/or confiscation of the driver’s license) or harm-based sanctions (civil or 
criminal liability after an accident is caused due to drunk driving). At present, 
the alcohol lock is sometimes installed to avoid repeat offences. The higher 
probability of drunk driving of someone who was already convicted for this of-
fence, justifies the still substantial costs of applying the technique. The mere 
probability of act-based and harm-based sanctions are too low for repeat offend-
ers, compared to the externalities they are likely to cause.24
Wittman analyzes the complicated relationship between act-based and harm-
based sanctions. In essence, the monitoring actor has four methods of control 
available: (1) the probability of detecting and sanctioning the act, (2) the sanc-
tion when the act is detected, (3) the probability of detecting and sanctioning 
harm and (4) the sanction when harm is detected. If a change in technology de-
creases the costs of detecting an act (e.g. the introduction of radar to monitor 
speed), act-based monitoring becomes more attractive compared to harm-based 
monitoring. The severity of the punishment will decrease, because the higher 
rate of detection leads to more convictions, thereby increasing the social costs of 
                                                
23  It is possible that a passenger takes the breath test, so that a drunken person can still drive. To de-
crease this problem, the test has to be repeated with random intervals (while driving) and taking the 
test for someone else is considered as a criminal offence.  
24  A recent Dutch situation provides an example regarding the relation between available information, 
technical measures, public or private initiative and the probability of ‘being caught’. One of the many 
tasks of the General Inspection Service (‘Algemene Inspectiedienst AID’) is to monitor cattle markets 
on cruelty to cattle. In 2005 the AID received information from vets and cattle traders that in some in-
stances animals were mistreated, and therefore additional supervision is executed. On August 24, 
2006, the foundation Animalrights Netherlands (‘Dierenrecht Nederland’) has published photographs 
and videos which were made with the use of hidden cameras, which show that mistreatment of cattle 
still occurs. The foundation has pressed charges against the persons involved. The Dutch Minister of 
Agriculture has responded that supervision by the AID has to be improved and increased. 
 In terms of this paper, vets and traders possessed private information regarding cruelty to animals, 
and after they conveyed this information to the AID, supervision was increased. Obviously, the idea 
behind increased supervision is to increase the probability of getting caught and hence the expected 
sanction. Apparently, the increased supervision did not solve the problem. This could very well be 
explained by the high costs of supervision (due to the costs of monitoring one should aim for optimal 
rather than maximal deterrence) and the fact that the AID has to supervise other activities as well. 
Private entities such as the foundation Animalrights are able to provide additional information, e.g. by 
using instruments which public bodies are not allowed to and by the fact that they can operate incog-
nito (cattle traders who see the AID inspector will probably behave according to the rules, just as 
many motorists will reduce their speed when they see a police car). As a result of the new informa-
tion, public monitoring might increase.  
 Obviously, the increase in public monitoring is not necessarily desirable. The AID might have to 
reduce supervision in other areas, which might lead to more problems in those areas. Cruelty to ani-
mals is an area where the public opinion is an important factor. From the perspective of Public Choice 
theory it is therefore not surprising (especially if one considers that general elections were scheduled 
to take place three months later!) that on the same day that Animalrights Netherlands published the 
evidence, members of Parliament have confronted the government with this issue, and the Minister of 
Agriculture has already promised increased supervision. It is noteworthy that in the general elections, 
the Party for the Animals ('Partij voor de Dieren') has won two seats in Parliament. 
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sanctioning. The expected act-based sanction increases, because the increase in 
probability outweighs the decrease in magnitude of the sanction.25
 
4.2. The role of information 
 
In section 3 it is already discussed that in setting the standard for behaviour, 
regulation makes use of the information of the government, negligence of the 
information of courts and strict liability of the information of the injurer.  
It is also mentioned that tort law uses the information that the victim has regard-
ing the identity of the injurer, because it requires the victim to bring suit against 
(a) specific defendant(s). Also the desire not to be harmed (again) and to see the 
injurer suffer sanctions can induce the victim to use his information to identify 
the injurer. 
In situations where the victim does not possess information on the identity of the 
injurer, public enforcement activity may be necessary. Private parties might not 
have enough incentives to identify the injurer, e.g. because they bear the full 
costs of identification but only expect little benefits. The private benefits of find-
ing the injurer can therefore be lower than the social benefits, which consist of 
the possibility to confront the injurer with the negative externalities he has cre-
ated. It can also be the case that it is socially desirable that information systems 
or other enforcement technologies are developed, but that it is not worthwhile 
for individuals to do so. Fingerprint records or DNA databases, shared informa-
tion systems, satellite surveillance for environmental pollution et cetera are so-
called natural monopolies. This means that they can be most cheaply produced 
on the largest possible scale, because they have huge fixed costs and low mar-
ginal costs. New information sharing technologies, e.g. through the Internet, can 
change this character, so that smaller units of information gathering might be-
come optimal, and private initiatives again become feasible. 
From an economic point of view it is  - all else being equal - desirable to use the 
instrument for internalizing externalities that retrieves the necessary information 
at lowest cost. Monitoring is a relatively expensive method to collect informa-
tion, especially compared to tort law. After all, under a regime of tort law the 
victim has an incentive to sue the injurer, so that the behaviour of potential in-
jurers need not be constantly monitored to discover harmful behaviour. Strict 
liability, moreover, induces the injurer to utilize his information in determining 
which care measures to take, because he always bears both the costs of those 
care measures and the expected losses. This reduces the need to monitor the in-
jurer for possible norm violating behaviour, as well as the need for the courts 
(negligence) or regulator (regulation) to attain the necessary information. Obvi-
ously, the relative weaknesses of tort law limit its information cost saving poten-
tial, so that regulation and/or criminal law might be necessary as well. 
 
 
                                                
25  Wittman 1977, op.cit. (note 5), p. 196. 
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4.3. The framework applied to the legal instruments26
 
In tort law, harm-based monetary sanctions are applied. Direct prevention would 
be impossible in many of the types of accidents that tort law seeks to deter. It is 
e.g. not possible to monitor many of the measures that motorists can take to 
avoid accidents, such as paying adequate attention to traffic instead of changing 
a CD, starting the journey on time so that time pressure is avoided, not driving 
when one is tired, et cetera. Act-based sanctions are also too costly, because 
many acts can cause losses. Monitoring all these types of behaviour and sanc-
tioning them is very costly, while in most cases no harm occurs. Harm-based 
sanctions are therefore the only feasible instrument to provide incentives for 
better behaviour. The mere fact that harm actually occurred can provide infor-
mation on the dangerousness of the activity, although it is important to keep in 
mind that also an injurer that takes due care can cause losses. Monetary sanc-
tions are often enough to provide the necessary incentives. In cases where the 
injurer deliberately reduces the chance that he will be identified (e.g. by leaving 
the scene of the accident that he has caused), non-monetary sanctions from 
criminal law might be used to provide adequate incentives after all. 
Regulation comes into play if the regulator has superior information, or if the 
harm-based sanctions of tort law do not adequately deter, e.g. due to the judg-
ment proof problem or a too low probability of being held liable. Shavell pro-
vides the examples of regulation to avoid a fire in a restaurant (large expected 
losses), health-related losses (difficult to establish causation, thereby lowering 
the probability of being held liable) and environmental losses (problems with 
causation and possible widely dispersed losses, which both lead to a too low 
probability of being held liable).27 Under these circumstances it is better to pre-
vent the act in the first place. When this is impossible or too costly, e.g. due to 
costs of monitoring, act-based sanctions are used. Obviously, these also require 
monitoring in order to detect the acts. If the probability of detection, combined 
with the possible fine, is not high enough to deter, criminal law might be 
needed. 
Criminals often try to avoid being detected and being caught. This reduces the 
probability that act-based or harm-based sanctions can be applied, so that the 
magnitude of the sanction has to be increased to offset this. This, together with 
the often limited assets of the criminal and the gains he expected to yield, ex-
plains the use of non-monetary sanctions. It also clarifies why criminal law 
sometimes tries to prevent the crime in the first place, and why attempts that do 
not succeed are punished nonetheless. Furthermore, people that committed 
crimes have shown that they were not deterred by the expected sanctions (‘gen-
                                                
26  Shavell 1993, op.cit. (note 4), p. 271 ff. 
27  Shavell 1993, op.cit. (note 4), p. 279. Also see M. Boyer and D. Porrini, ‘The Choice of Instruments 
for Environmental Policy: Liability or Regulation?’, in:  R.O. Zerbe and T. Swanson (eds.), An Intro-
duction to the Law and Economics of Environmental Policy: Issues in Institutional Design, Volume 
20, Elsevier Science Ltd., p. 246. 
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eral deterrence’), and imprisonment might be the only way to prevent them 
from committing further crimes (‘specific deterrence’). 
 
Polinksy and Shavell distinguish between fixed and variable enforcement 
costs.28 The fixed enforcement costs are independent of the number of violations 
of a standard and are incurred to reach or maintain a certain probability of detec-
tion. The variable enforcement costs on the other hand depend on the number of 
violations and are made in order to actually fine the violator. The optimal fine 
equals the harm, corrected for the probability of detection, as well as the vari-
able enforcement costs. This implies that the optimal fine will increase if vari-
able enforcement costs rise and/or if the probability of detection decreases due 
to higher fixed enforcement costs. The optimal probability of detection de-
creases if fixed and/or variable enforcement costs increase. It simply becomes 
too expensive to detect violations and/or to impose the sanction on violators. 
Monitoring concerns fixed enforcement costs. Therefore, if technological 
changes decrease these costs, the optimal probability of detection increases, and 
the optimal magnitude of the fine decreases. These changes increase the attrac-
tiveness of regulation vis-à-vis tort law and criminal law.  
 
4.4. Liability of monitoring agencies 
 
An interesting and actual topic where several of the abovementioned insights are 
relevant is liability for monitoring agencies.29 In many fields of public safety, 
governments make use of monitoring agencies that have to check whether actors 
in the relevant field behave according to the applicable regulation. Examples can 
be found regarding the quality and safety of food, medicines, consumer goods, 
safety of the workplace, et cetera. These agencies should contribute to public 
safety by responding to observed norm violating behaviour through e.g. impos-
ing fines, withdrawing permits or even forcefully correcting dangerous situa-
tions. 
If an actor violates the rules and thereby causes losses, the monitoring agency 
cannot be automatically held liable for these losses. Only if the supervision was 
inadequate or if the agency did not respond to a situation where it should have 
responded, liability can be an issue. It is important to note that the monitoring 
agencies have a certain degree of freedom in determining their policy, so that 
courts will act reservedly in establishing liability. 
The supervisors experience the so-called supervisor’s dilemma: if they are not 
active enough, third parties might start a tort suit against them for the resulting 
losses. However, if they take measures that in hindsight were not necessary (e.g. 
withdraw a permit or close an installation), they can be held liable for the nega-
tive consequences by the affected actors. Obviously, if the supervisor is held 
                                                
28  A.M. Polinksy and S. Shavell, ‘Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of 
Fines’, (35) The Journal of Law and Economics 1992, p. 133. 
29  See e.g. C.C. van Dam, Aansprakelijkheid van Toezichthouders, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law 2006 (www.wodc.nl/images/1189_deel1_volledige%20tekst_tcm11-112960.pdf). 
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liable for the losses caused by a rule violating actor, the supervisor might take 
recourse on the actual injurer. The administrative costs of such recourse actions, 
however, can be substantial.30  
Most monitoring agencies have reported that they are not influenced in their 
policy by the possible liability claims from third parties. The explanation for this 
is, that they base their decisions on their ideas of professionalism. The agencies 
themselves do not plea for abolishment of liability, because they regard the li-
ability claims as a test for their professionalism and quality.31 Obviously, liabil-
ity can influence monitoring policy, because agencies pay attention to case law 
in determining their policy. It is not the fear of liability, but the possible impact 
of liability cases of e.g. standards of care that indirectly can influence supervi-
sors.32
Kraakman argues that while most legal devices for recruiting private enforce-
ment rely on rewards, this is impossible with ‘gatekeepers’ (an actor that can 
prevent misconduct by withholding support, such as not issuing a permit). Their 
efforts to withhold support from wrongdoing are invisible and difficult to verify, 
so that we can only observe ex post the occasions where the gatekeeper fails to 
prevent misconduct ex ante.33 Imposing liability on failing gatekeepers creates 
administrative costs. Whether or not these costs are worthwhile depends on the 
extent in which the threat of liability improves the supervision by the gate-
keeper. It is difficult to draw general conclusions on this issue. 
 
5. Monitoring and enforcement of environmental policy as an  
example 
 
Cohen has given an extensive overview of economic literature on monitoring 
and enforcement of environmental policy.34 In this section I will sketch the re-
sults of this survey that are most important for the topic of this workshop on 
monitoring and supervision, and add insights from other relevant literature. 
An important way to improve the effectiveness of monitoring is to divide firms 
that were monitored into two groups. The first group consists of firms that com-
plied at the last inspection and the second of firms that did not comply. Firms in 
group 2 are subsequently monitored more often, the regulatory standards for 
them might be tougher and/or the sanctions more severe, as compared to group 
1. It appears that this scheme leads to a higher rate of compliance than subject-
ing all firms to the same monitoring regime. 
If firms differ in the effectiveness of an audit, meaning that norm breaking be-
haviour of some firms is more difficult to detect than such behaviour of other 
firms, it is best to first audit the firms that are easiest to audit. As the budget for 
                                                
30  W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, ‘Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis’, (9) Journal 
of Legal Studies 1980, p. 529, 530. 
31  See Van Dam 2006, op.cit. (note 29), p. 72. 
32  See e.g. Van Dam 2006, op.cit. (note 29), p. 137, 138. 
33  R.H. Kraakman, ‘Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy’, (2) Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organization 1986, p. 60. 
34  M.A. Cohen, Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Policy, 1998. 
  
116 L.T. Visscher 
audit increases, more firms can be monitored. The firms most difficult to audit 
might not be monitored at all, which could induce them to pollute as much as 
they like. This problem might be limited, however, by the fact that a high level 
of pollution in itself can attract the attention of the auditing agency. Further-
more, firms that value pollution the least should be audited first, because they 
can be deterred relatively easy. A low probability of detection might already be 
enough to deter these firms, so that the costs of monitoring them are low.35 The 
general insight that monitoring costs lower the optimal rate of compliance, so 
that one should not strive for maximum but optimum compliance, is also present 
in the literature regarding enforcement of environmental law.36
In the above sections it already became clear that the optimal magnitude of the 
sanction and the probability of conviction are interrelated. It is possible to save 
monitoring costs by increasing the magnitude of the sanction, because the lower 
probability is offset by the larger magnitude of the sanction. However, the pos-
sible magnitude of the sanction is limited by the wealth of the offender, ideas of 
fairness, the need for marginal deterrence and risk aversion. This last argument 
implies that actors prefer a larger probability of a small loss to a smaller prob-
ability of a large loss, the reason behind it being that a twice as large loss in 
money leads to a more than twice as large loss in utility. After all, actors spend 
their first euros on the most important needs, and subsequent money is spent on 
lesser needs. Larger losses therefore also endanger the more important needs. 
Hence, a tradeoff exists between the desire to lower monitoring costs (by in-
creasing the fine and decreasing the probability of being caught), and the de-
crease in welfare it causes due to risk aversion.37
Another way to decrease the costs of monitoring is to induce self-reporting be-
haviour.38 This instrument shifts (part of) the monitoring costs onto firms (who 
now have to investigate whether pollution occurs), which is socially desirable if 
firms can monitor at lower cost than the government. It is possible to require 
firms to report violations of environmental standards and to base the possible 
sanction for violating behaviour on whether the firm indeed reported this. Firms 
that did report will be subjected to lower sanctions than firms that did not report, 
to induce them to self-report. Failure to report or submitting false reports could 
even be labelled as crimes, to make this kind of behaviour very unattractive. 
Obviously, the higher the sanction for pollution, the more resources firms might 
spend on trying to evade detection, so that the quality of the self-reports might 
decrease. Self-reporting introduces new monitoring costs, because the self-
reports have to be audited. The total costs decrease if the costs of monitoring 
behaviour are high and/or the maximum feasible fine is limited. However, self-
                                                
35  I. Macho-Stadler and D. Pérez-Castrillo, ‘Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms’ Emissions and 
Compliance with Environmental Taxes’, UFAE and IAE Working Paper 612.04 2004, p. 13, 14. 
36  See e.g. C. Arguedas, ‘Pollution Standards, Costly Monitoring and Fines, CentER Discussion Paper 
No. 2005-09 2005, p. 4, 16, 17. 
37  See e.g. A.M. Polinksy and S. Shavell, ‘The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’, (38) 
The Journal of Economic Literature 2000, p. 53, 54. 
38  See e.g. L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, ‘Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior’, 
(102) Journal of Political Economy 194, p. 583-606. 
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reporting probably increases costs if the costs of collecting penalties are high or 
if the regulator’s monitoring technology is very accurate. 
Cohen discusses the scarce empirical literature regarding environmental en-
forcement. Monitoring oil transfer operations and random port patrols designed 
to detect spills are found to be effective, but routine inspections that are de-
signed to determine if vessels are in compliance with oil spill prevention regula-
tions has no significant effect on spill size.39 This implies that harm-based sanc-
tions are more effective than act-based sanctions. Furthermore, the implemented 
change in monitoring policy of the U.S. Coast Guard to classify ships into ‘low 
risk’ (infrequently monitored) and ‘high risk’ (always monitored) turned out to 
reduce the costs of enforcement, without having a negative effect on the envi-
ronment. This offers an empirical corroboration of the theoretical idea described 
above: decreasing monitoring costs by supervising high risks more intensively 
than low risks. Research on monitoring and fines regarding industry emissions 
in the U.S. and Canada shows that both methods reduce the levels of pollution, 
although a 10% increase in fines appears to have a larger impact than a 10% 
increase in monitoring activity. Most researches also show that firms that were 
monitored and that complied are less likely to be inspected in the next period. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have discussed the literature on the economic analysis of optimal 
law enforcement and the role of monitoring and supervision. Tort law, regula-
tion and criminal law are different instruments for the internalization of negative 
externalities. These instruments all have strengths and weaknesses, and optimal 
enforcement requires a mix of all instruments. 
Monitoring and supervision in this paper regard the situation where an actor ob-
serves the behaviour of another actor, in order to establish whether the latter has 
acted according to the applicable norms or standards of behaviour. Tort law, 
which has an ex post character, does not rely on monitoring and supervision in 
this sense, with the possible exception of vicarious liability, where the principal 
(e.g. an employer) has incentives to monitor the behaviour of the agent (e.g. the 
employee), in order to be able to induce him to avoid losses. 
Within the context of monitoring, it is possible to distinguish between input and 
output monitoring, where the former relies on act-based sanctions and the latter 
on harm-based sanctions. Furthermore, it is possible to preclude damaging acts 
from occurring in the first place, by applying physical restrictions or force. 
A general preference for tort law exists, due to the relative low costs of this in-
strument. However, problems of judgment proof and a limited probability of 
being convicted limit the possibilities of tort law. Criminal law has to be used as 
ultimum remedium, due to the high system costs and social costs.  
If input and output monitoring are very costly, preclusion is attractive. If input 
monitoring becomes cheaper (e.g. speed control by radar), act-based sanctions 
                                                
39  Cohen 1998, op.cit. (note 34), p. 33. 
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become more attractive. If output monitoring becomes cheaper (e.g. due to the 
possibilities of satellites to detect dumping of toxic waste), harm-based sanc-
tions become more important. 
The costs of monitoring are just one of the many factors that determine optimal 
enforcement, so it’s importance should not be overstressed. However, because 
the costs are substantial, they should not be neglected either. Technological 
changes that decrease the costs of certain monitoring devices leads to a higher 
level of optimal enforcement, but also to a shift between the different instru-
ments to internalize negative externalities. 
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